One of the most difficult questions for NATO and U.S. commanders in Afghanistan is how and when to use our vast superiority in air power on a terrorist civilian enemy.
Last month U.S. aircraft mistook three buses carrying native civilians for enemy vehicles they had been ordered to attack. The result was the killing of innocent Afghan civilians.
As with artillery, the results of shelling can’t always be predicted and innocent civilians are often killed, but if the shelling is along a front along which two armies are facing one another, there’s less chance of innocents being killed.
Air power, on the other hand, is not usually utilized on armies confronting one another, but behind the lines. The difficulty in Afghanistan is there is an enemy of civilian terrorists mixed in with the native population in towns and cities and the countryside.
That limits utilization of our greatly superior air power. And it may be that greater use of air strikes and bombing could be counterproductive in Afghanistan.
Past history shows that we have, in past wars, overestimated what superior air power can accomplish.
In World War II we thought aerial bombing could win the war. The British R.A.F. commander thought his massive attacks on target cities would win the war. On one R.A.F. bombing mission in this month in 1943 Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris launched 800 heavy bombers to attack Nuremberg– the spiritual home of Nazism.
That night 95 bombers were shot down, 9 others crashed in England and many landed shot up with wounded airmen aboard. About a thousand airmen were lost. On this month in 1945 the U.S. Army Air Force launched a thousand bomber raid on Berlin. Sixty-nine were lost–690 crew plus eight fighter pilots. Post-war evaluations came to the conclusion results didn’t justify ordering so many airmen to their death. (The writer was on that mission.)
In Vietnam, fighting against both terrorists and an army our vastly superior air power couldn’t win that war, and the massive killing of civilians turned many Vietnamese against us. Thus the careful use of our air power advantage in Afghanistan is highly important.
The killing of 21 civilians on three buses in Afghanistan in February hasn’t turned most Afghans against us but it is a warning. The Taliban has many supporters among the civilian population. The killing of civilians on the three buses was widely publicized, and was the fourth mistake our air strikes have made this year, killing innocent civilian Afghans.
These strikes from the air could have done more harm than good.
Looking At Washington: Air Power In War
Last month U.S. aircraft mistook three buses carrying native civilians for enemy vehicles they had been ordered to attack. The result was the killing of innocent Afghan civilians.
As with artillery, the results of shelling can’t always be predicted and innocent civilians are often killed, but if the shelling is along a front along which two armies are facing one another, there’s less chance of innocents being killed.
Air power, on the other hand, is not usually utilized on armies confronting one another, but behind the lines. The difficulty in Afghanistan is there is an enemy of civilian terrorists mixed in with the native population in towns and cities and the countryside.
That limits utilization of our greatly superior air power. And it may be that greater use of air strikes and bombing could be counterproductive in Afghanistan.
Past history shows that we have, in past wars, overestimated what superior air power can accomplish.
In World War II we thought aerial bombing could win the war. The British R.A.F. commander thought his massive attacks on target cities would win the war. On one R.A.F. bombing mission in this month in 1943 Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris launched 800 heavy bombers to attack Nuremberg– the spiritual home of Nazism.
That night 95 bombers were shot down, 9 others crashed in England and many landed shot up with wounded airmen aboard. About a thousand airmen were lost. On this month in 1945 the U.S. Army Air Force launched a thousand bomber raid on Berlin. Sixty-nine were lost–690 crew plus eight fighter pilots. Post-war evaluations came to the conclusion results didn’t justify ordering so many airmen to their death. (The writer was on that mission.)
In Vietnam, fighting against both terrorists and an army our vastly superior air power couldn’t win that war, and the massive killing of civilians turned many Vietnamese against us. Thus the careful use of our air power advantage in Afghanistan is highly important.
The killing of 21 civilians on three buses in Afghanistan in February hasn’t turned most Afghans against us but it is a warning. The Taliban has many supporters among the civilian population. The killing of civilians on the three buses was widely publicized, and was the fourth mistake our air strikes have made this year, killing innocent civilian Afghans.
These strikes from the air could have done more harm than good.