Thwarting Nuclear Terror in Texas: Investigation — Did ‘Ghost Troop’ prevent a nuke scheme on its first mission?
Did ‘Ghost Troop’ prevent a nuke scheme on its first mission? HOUSTON The so-called “global war on terror” entered a dangerous new phase for Americans on March 11, 2004, when bomb explosions within the Madrid, Spain transit system killed 191 people and wounded 2,050. Within a day of the bombing, Fox News laid responsibility on “Al Qaeda Terror,” claiming it was now “90 percent ready” for a “Black Wind of Death” attack on America. Other global media speculated that Al Qaeda had acquired a suitcase nuke from somewhere within the former Soviet Union. These media have warned the public repeatedly ever since that it is no longer a question of if, but rather of when Al Qaeda will explode a nuke on U.S. soil. Ominously for Texans, a year earlier the Bush Administration had released an NSA intercept that Bin Laden wanted to hit the Houston area petrochemical complex. On February 23, 2003, the Houston Chronicle ran on op-ed emay, “Don’t Laugh at Duct Tape, It Saves Lives.” In it May argued that the Houston area was unquestionably a top terror target. It was the nation’s fourth most populous city, the home of the Johnson Space Center and the declared hometown of the Bush family. Lastly, it not only had the nation’s largest chemical district, but also a climate that could enhance the lethality of a chemical attack. The “black wind” threat sounded like it could involve a possible mini-nuke attack on the petrochemical industry. This could spread toxic clouds over Houston similar to the catastrophe in Bhopal, India. May was a former U.S. Army Intelligence officer and a longstanding Houston resident. In all probability, no one in the Bush Administration anticipated that a person with his professional qualifications would eventually form a “Ghost Troop” of anti-war activists and charge members of the Bush team with foul play. Paradoxically, back in 2004 May’s most senior officer of Ghost Troop was Chase Untermeyer, May’s long-time friend, who had served as best man at his wedding. Untermeyer was a former Navy lieutenant and Bush family intimate who later became assistant Secretary of the Navy under Ronald Reagan. He was also the White House transition team leader between the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. The presence of a high-level insider lent credibility to the early stages of May’s black sheep cyber-intelligence unit. At this time, Ghost Troop had dozens of former military and civilian members. They included Captain John Spooner, an Air Force Korean War veteran; Staff Sergeant Lee Neadows, an Army air cavalry Vietnam Veteran; and Kay Lucas, Director of the Crawford Peace House. All are still active in Ghost Troop, and believe that their collective efforts after the Madrid bombings affected US and world history. The aggressiveness of America’s national media in blaming Al Qaeda for the Madrid bombings aroused suspicion in Ghost Troop. The Spanish government originally blamed the Basque separatist group ETA. The bombings came only four days before national elections, and with the bombings blamed on ETA, political analysts believed that the electorate would favor the anti-terror policies of the party in power. Supposedly these tough policies had reduced ETA to desperation. On the other hand, if Al Qaeda was involved, the Spanish public might perceive this as blow-bac